CHE.496/2008/Responses/a7: Difference between revisions

From OpenWetWare
Jump to navigationJump to search
Line 14: Line 14:
**This brief article discusses some of the potential solutions to the problems of a new technology, DNA synthesis. The paper points out that with DNA synthesis becoming easier and easier to do, there needs to be some intervention so people do not create dangerous organisms, such as the black plague, 1918 flu, or smallpox. They suggest government and legal oversight, and several solutions. The best system seems like using computer programs to screen dangerous sequences. This allows a range of people to use this new technology, while at the same time keeping people safe. It is a very useful article to consider before performing research in this new field.
**This brief article discusses some of the potential solutions to the problems of a new technology, DNA synthesis. The paper points out that with DNA synthesis becoming easier and easier to do, there needs to be some intervention so people do not create dangerous organisms, such as the black plague, 1918 flu, or smallpox. They suggest government and legal oversight, and several solutions. The best system seems like using computer programs to screen dangerous sequences. This allows a range of people to use this new technology, while at the same time keeping people safe. It is a very useful article to consider before performing research in this new field.
*'''[[User:KPHershey|KPHershey]] 14:23, 5 February 2008 (CST)'''
*'''[[User:KPHershey|KPHershey]] 14:23, 5 February 2008 (CST)'''
===Dan Tarjan's Response===
*'''The Promise and Perils of Synthetic Biology
**The article in the New Atlantic is a verbose overview of synbio with several sections focusing on potential risks. They talk about the different avenues in which the emerging field could create risks and potential methods for mitigating those risks. With more than half the article dedicated to the hazard-aspect the article leans towards alarmism, although it is more subdued than other more 'mainstream' articles on the topic.
*'''DNA synthesis and biological security
**This article proposes a regulatory framework to oversee the field of synbio. It is more detailed than the proposals made in the New Atlantic. Essentially DNA synthesis companies will have a computer check orders for sequences which might be harmful, and the rest is just bureaucracy. Considering that DNA synthesis may well move from these companies down to a table-top device in the future this approach towards regulation will break down. No doubt regulators will require all such machines to have firmware that does the sequence checking locally, but like with any other device these restrictions will be circumvented by anyone with actual malicious intent.
*'''[[User:Daniel R Tarjan|Daniel R Tarjan]] 13:49, 6 February 2008 (CST)'''

Revision as of 12:49, 6 February 2008

CHE.496: Biological Systems Design Seminar

Home        People        Schedule        Assignments        Responses        Projects        Links        Help       

Social implications


Kevin Hershey's Response

  • The Promise and Perils of Synthetic Biology
    • The purpose of the article by Tucker and Zilinskas is to provide information regarding the potential rewards and dangers of this emerging field. The first part of the paper introduces synthetic biology, an issue already covered in this course. After the introduction, they bring up three potential risks. They are 1) organisms escape laboratory and proliferate, 2) after being deliberately released in environment, the organism may have unwanted dangerous side effects, and 3) terrorist organizations may use the organisms for their own purpose. With these three risks are not new to the field of genetic engineering. In fact, there are very tight laws on the selling of engineered animals, because people are already aware of the risk to an extent. However, even though these are not new issues, they are still important to consider and examine when performing synthetic biology research. This paper has several solutions to this problem, they are screening of oligonucleotide sequences (for dangers such as smallpox DNA), ecological modeling (so the organisms effect on nature can be better understood), oversight of research (for more control so dangerous research can be halted), and public outreach and education (to educate the public and raise awareness). They finish by saying that synthetic biology should take a lesson from Asilomar in 1975, where recombinant DNA has been used for, in general, good since its discovery.
  • DNA Synthesis and Biological Securtiy
    • This brief article discusses some of the potential solutions to the problems of a new technology, DNA synthesis. The paper points out that with DNA synthesis becoming easier and easier to do, there needs to be some intervention so people do not create dangerous organisms, such as the black plague, 1918 flu, or smallpox. They suggest government and legal oversight, and several solutions. The best system seems like using computer programs to screen dangerous sequences. This allows a range of people to use this new technology, while at the same time keeping people safe. It is a very useful article to consider before performing research in this new field.
  • KPHershey 14:23, 5 February 2008 (CST)


Dan Tarjan's Response

  • The Promise and Perils of Synthetic Biology
    • The article in the New Atlantic is a verbose overview of synbio with several sections focusing on potential risks. They talk about the different avenues in which the emerging field could create risks and potential methods for mitigating those risks. With more than half the article dedicated to the hazard-aspect the article leans towards alarmism, although it is more subdued than other more 'mainstream' articles on the topic.
  • DNA synthesis and biological security
    • This article proposes a regulatory framework to oversee the field of synbio. It is more detailed than the proposals made in the New Atlantic. Essentially DNA synthesis companies will have a computer check orders for sequences which might be harmful, and the rest is just bureaucracy. Considering that DNA synthesis may well move from these companies down to a table-top device in the future this approach towards regulation will break down. No doubt regulators will require all such machines to have firmware that does the sequence checking locally, but like with any other device these restrictions will be circumvented by anyone with actual malicious intent.
  • Daniel R Tarjan 13:49, 6 February 2008 (CST)