IGEM:Carnegie Mellon University/2009/Notebook/SUCCEED Survey and Peer Incentives/2014/02/03: Difference between revisions
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Alex asked for papers more relevant to peer incentives, found these: | |||
Student incentives - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1574069206020150 | |||
Productivity under group incentives - http://www.jstor.org/stable/2951348 | |||
1. The performance of an experimental group in the past influences the performance under any group incentive performances in the present in terms of effort level. | |||
2. Tournament-based group incentives are very effective | |||
3. Monitoring works but is costly | |||
Social effects of team incentives - http://www.nber.org/papers/w16687 | |||
In a team setting, team members value effort from other team members differently than their own, and team incentives are more cost-efficient, suggesting a social effect from working in a team. | |||
Incentives for task-related efforts in workgroups - http://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/abs/10.1287/mnsc.1070.0714 | |||
If employees are outcome-linked, the optimal incentive scheme for individuals is individual reward and in group, it is group punishment. When people within a group have the opportunity to help one another, optimal group incentives are positive. Also, when people in a group can share information, individual and group incentives play complementary roles to each other. | |||
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Alex asked for papers more relevant to peer incentives, found these: Student incentives - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1574069206020150
1. The performance of an experimental group in the past influences the performance under any group incentive performances in the present in terms of effort level. 2. Tournament-based group incentives are very effective 3. Monitoring works but is costly
In a team setting, team members value effort from other team members differently than their own, and team incentives are more cost-efficient, suggesting a social effect from working in a team.
If employees are outcome-linked, the optimal incentive scheme for individuals is individual reward and in group, it is group punishment. When people within a group have the opportunity to help one another, optimal group incentives are positive. Also, when people in a group can share information, individual and group incentives play complementary roles to each other. |