Synthetic Society/Biological Risks and Security

From OpenWetWare

< Synthetic Society
Revision as of 13:19, 9 January 2006 by Endy (Talk | contribs)
(diff) ←Older revision | Current revision (diff) | Newer revision→ (diff)
Jump to: navigation, search

We are currently trying to develop a strategy for organizing our work.

  • Suggestion. If possible, focus only on the "delta" impact on biological risk & security due to synthetic biology, not the entire biological security and risk landscape. We need to evaluate whether or not this is possible?
    • What are the intentional SB contributions to risk?
    • What are the accidental SB contributions to risk?
    • What are the active SB contributions to security?
    • What are the passive SB contributions to security?
  • Suggestion. Evaluate costs associated with using synthetic biology technologies relative to other already accessible approaches. In doing this also evaluate who will have access to these technologies?
  • Suggestion. What sorts of uncertainty frame our thinking?
  • Suggestion. Develop bracketing use cases important examples that inform our discussions.
    • For example, an agent that is trivial to obtain, but hard to weaponize.
    • For example, an agent that is hard to obtain (today), but is itself already a weapon.
  • Suggestion. Consider issues of speed, cost, diffusion, and luck.
    • For example, how can we evaluate whether or not we can afford to use / ignore lists of top 100 agents?
    • For example, can we come up with capabilities-based strategies?
  • Todo.
    • How should we make progress on these issues? I.e., how to do the research?
Personal tools