Synthetic Society/Biological Risks and Security

From OpenWetWare
Revision as of 10:19, 9 January 2006 by Endy (talk | contribs)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Jump to navigationJump to search
The printable version is no longer supported and may have rendering errors. Please update your browser bookmarks and please use the default browser print function instead.

We are currently trying to develop a strategy for organizing our work.

  • Suggestion. If possible, focus only on the "delta" impact on biological risk & security due to synthetic biology, not the entire biological security and risk landscape. We need to evaluate whether or not this is possible?
    • What are the intentional SB contributions to risk?
    • What are the accidental SB contributions to risk?
    • What are the active SB contributions to security?
    • What are the passive SB contributions to security?
  • Suggestion. Evaluate costs associated with using synthetic biology technologies relative to other already accessible approaches. In doing this also evaluate who will have access to these technologies?
  • Suggestion. What sorts of uncertainty frame our thinking?
  • Suggestion. Develop bracketing use cases important examples that inform our discussions.
    • For example, an agent that is trivial to obtain, but hard to weaponize.
    • For example, an agent that is hard to obtain (today), but is itself already a weapon.
  • Suggestion. Consider issues of speed, cost, diffusion, and luck.
    • For example, how can we evaluate whether or not we can afford to use / ignore lists of top 100 agents?
    • For example, can we come up with capabilities-based strategies?
  • Todo.
    • How should we make progress on these issues? I.e., how to do the research?